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To provide new understanding of the effect of historical ties in the field of international business, 
through the lens of institutional theory and the concept of the liability of foreignness, we examine 
how prior colonial relationships influence inward FDI from former colonisers to their former 
colonies in Africa. With an estimation based on a balanced panel of annual observations from 2001 
to 2012, we find that prior colonial ties are positively related to inward FDI from colonisers to 
former colonies. However, there is substantial heterogeneity in colonial relationships, with the 
nature of British colonialism more likely to exhibit the colonial relationship in explaining inward 
FDI. Moreover, there is ambiguity associated with the influence of the time period of colonization 
and the time period of independence on inward FDI. We report a negative relationship between 
the period a country was a colony and FDI from the coloniser and a U-shape relationship between 
the period of independence and FDI from the coloniser. Our findings indicate that the nature and 









Jones and Khanna (2006: 453) appealed for the field of international business to evolve ‘from the 
relatively uncontroversial idea that 'history matters' to exploring how it matters’ One way of 
exploring how it matters is to investigate historical ties, which are ‘historical relations between 
specific pairs of countries that have been developed intentionally (formal ties) or have evolved 
naturally over time (informal ties)’ (Makino and Tsang, 2011: 546). Historical ties establish an 
institutional framework (North, 1990) within which relationships between associated countries 
occur. Makino and Tsang (2011) point out that in prior research identification of key factors 
affecting FDI flows has overlooked the effects of relational factors that have been historically 
developed between countries. Accordingly, this paper seeks to "bring history back into 
international business" (Jones and Khanna, 2006) by examining the question:  how do the colonial 
ties between European colonisers and their African colonies influence the flow of FDI between 
metropole and colony countries? From a theoretical and practical perspective this is an important 
question. We seek to unpack the ‘how’ by examining the influence of colonial ties on FDI, 
exploring the heterogenous effects of colonisers, and examining the consequences of the duration 
of the colonial period and the length of time since independence on FDI. These elements of the 
coloniser-colony relationship have not been investigated in prior literature.  
In contrast to most other emerging markets, Africa is a suitable context for this study because of 
the nature and relatively recent experience of colonization of African countries (Ellis et al., 2018). 
Nunn (2007: 158) characterizes Africa’s history by two events, the slave trade and colonial rule 
and asks, ‘Why do these events, which ended years ago, continue to matter today?’ One answer 
lies in the nature of the institutions imposed by the colonisers that persist today (Acemoglu et al., 
2001). Colonial institutions shape current institutions and consequently affect the accountability 
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of the government, democratic competition, property rights protection, prevention of corruption, 
and rule of law (Mizuno and Okazawa, 2009). The long-lasting effects of colonisation, such as, 
the widespread use of the coloniser’s language, similar institutional structures, and business 
practices (Liou and Rao-Nicholson, 2017), can reduce the ‘costs of foreignness’, and consequently 
increase the possibilities of investment (Lundan and Jones 2001).  
  Although the formal institutions present in a developing country may be a legacy of its former 
coloniser, we argue that a country’s colonial history also generates informal institutions that may 
be hard to overcome by a firm from the former coloniser. Further, we argue that the changes in the 
nature of FDI to developing countries, for example, from resource seeking to market seeking, will 
exacerbate the liability of foreignness (LOF) (Zaheer, 1995) related to past colonial ties. 
Understanding this offers a more complete perspective on the nature of the host–home country 
relationship, and the nature of institutions in this setting.   
Institutional legacies are also related to LOF through country-of-origin (COO) effects, where 
MNEs face an additional difficulty resulting from the different treatment that foreign companies 
receive from local stakeholders because of their ‘‘foreignness’’ (Mezias, 2002). COO refers to the 
MNE’s home country and represents the background/history of the organization to host country 
stakeholders. This reflects the perception that countries, like firms, have brand equity (Kim and 
Chung, 1997).  This identity can play a significant role in foreign markets location (Moeller et al., 
2013). The image of the MNE may be damaged by the past acts of the country-of-origin of the 
organization. Where the perception of the company is dramatically influenced by the host country 
this is an added burden of the LOF. Even though an individual company itself may not have 
‘earned’ the adverse reputation, all companies from the same home country may suffer this 
negative effect. Hence a stigma may be attached to the MNE, its products, brands and employees. 
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In effect country image summarizes consumers' beliefs about product attributes and directly affects 
their attitude toward the brand (Han, 1989). Moeller et al. (2013) argue that COO is the anchor 
point for the international strategic actions of the MNE and suggest that COO plays an important 
role is determining whether an MNE has the potential to succeed in a host country environment. 
Importantly, Moeller et al. (2013) conclude that the management of the MNE should be aware of 
potential resistance to accept the MNE and its products and must develop a proactive set of 
strategies to address the negativism of host country stakeholders. Such resistance may be 
particularly acute for MNEs whose home country is a former coloniser of the host country.  
Another important factor lies in recognizing that the colonial experience was not homogeneous, 
but varied in nature between the European colonisers, with the differential experience ultimately 
impacting on inward FDI. Moreover, the historical relationship could vary from being favourable 
to being hostile. The character of the historical relationship is likely to effect economic exchanges 
between two countries, including FDI (Chowdhury and Maung, 2018). We explore these issues in 
what follows. 
Few prior studies have examined historical ties and in particular whether the historical relationship 
between two nations is important for FDI. Makino and Tsang (2011) examine ties between France 
and Vietnam and their effect on FDI, Kedia and Bilgili (2015) examine links between Russia and 
former Soviet Republics to investigate the effect of institutional distance between home and host 
countries on the percentage of shares acquired in target companies. Chowdhury and Maung (2018) 
consider how historical ties between home and host countries contribute to the total number of 
cross-border mergers and acquisitions (CBMAs) from colonies to colonisers. The papers by 
Makino and Tsang (2011) and Kedia and Bilgili (2015) are narrowly focused on historical ties 
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between two nations, whereas Chowdhury and Maung (2018) consider CBMA data from 37 ex-
colonies (including for example, USA, Canada, Australia and ten African countries).  
We consider FDI from former colonisers (six countries) to their former African colonies (49 
countries). George et al. (2016) point out that scholars in various fields have regularly considered 
colonial legacies a source of Africa’s ongoing difficulties and that the examination of the enduring 
effects of Africa’s institutional legacies is an underexplored area. To the best of our knowledge 
prior studies of African inward FDI do not specifically refer to colonial ties as a determinant of 
FDI. We find the expected overall positive effect on inward FDI of prior colonial ties, although 
this finding varies with the coloniser given that the experience of colonization was heterogeneous. 
Further, we highlight the potential ambiguity of colonial ties, in the sense of acting both to 
encourage and to discourage FDI from the coloniser. We report a negative relationship between 
the period of time a country was a colony and the extent of inward FDI from the coloniser. We 
also show that following independence the detrimental effect of colonization on FDI from the 
coloniser eventually dissipates.  
The paper is organised as follows. The next section provides a review of the literature structured 
to include a brief overview of the colonial development of Africa, the delineation of institutional 
theory which serves as our theoretical lens, and consideration of how the liability of foreignness 
affects the legitimacy of an MNE in a foreign institutional environment. We then develop the 
study’s hypotheses based on the implications of colonial ties for FDI. We next set out the research 
methods. Findings are then presented, followed by discussion and conclusion, including 




Literature Review  
Colonial development of Africa 
The period from the sixteenth to the nineteenth century represents the era in which almost all parts 
of the world came to be dominated to some degree by the large European powers of Britain, France, 
the Netherlands, Spain, Austria-Hungary, and Russia (Iammarino and McCann, 2013: 250). The 
majority of the commercial activities of these states were dominated by economic and trading 
relations primarily contained within their individual colonial systems. In effect the leading 
European countries sought to increase their trade by acquiring colonies and using tariffs and war 
to prevent other countries from trading with them. Allen (2011) argues that colonies were acquired 
for both economic and strategic reasons. In the expectation that ‘they would supply tropical 
products to the imperial power and be a market for its manufactures, as well as providing places 
for its citizens to settle and profitable investments for its bourgeoisie. In addition, empires were 
regarded as civilizing missions that would spread Christianity and raise native culture to the 
standard of Europe’ (Allen, 2011:102-103). By the turn of the twentieth century, for instance, the 
British Empire spanned about one quarter of the globe, resulting in a two-way flow of trade, with 
Britain importing raw materials from its colonies and exporting finished and semi-finished goods. 
As Ferguson (2004: xxv) notes ‘The British Empire began as a primarily economic phenomenon, 
its growth powered by commerce and consumerism.’ Up to the early twentieth century, many 
British, French and Dutch commercial enterprises had multiple facilities and operations scattered 
across all their respective empires as well as across their home countries. Yet up until this period, 
as noted, the economic engagement was dominated by exporting and importing operations, rather 
than by actual direct investment in each other’s economies (Findlay and O’Rourke, 2007). 
8 
As part of the colonisation process, in the late nineteenth century, during the so-called ‘Scramble 
for Africa’, the European powers divided the continent into political partitions at the Berlin 
Conference of 1884-85. ‘Within twenty short years after 1880, … ten thousand African tribal 
kingdoms were transformed into just forty states, of which thirty-six were under direct European 
control. Never in human history had there been such drastic redrawing of the map of a continent’ 
(Ferguson, 2004: 222). By 1905, the control of almost all of Africa was claimed by Western 
European governments, the only exceptions being Liberia (which had been settled by African 
American former slaves) and Ethiopia (which had successfully resisted colonisation by Italy). The 
greatest number of colonies in Africa was held by Britain and France, but Germany, Portugal, 
Belgium, Italy and Spain also had colonies. Following the First World War, Germany lost her 
colonies to the other European powers. Somalia was jointly colonised by Britain and Italy, and 
Namibia was effectively controlled by South Africa. The list of former colonies and their 
colonisers on which this paper is based, together with the dates of colonisation and independence, 
are shown in the Appendix.  
 
Institutional Theory 
Greve and Rao (2014: 28) note that ‘The link between history and the present, ….. is supplied by 
institutional legacies that span large swaths of time.’ We draw on institutional theory, to examine 
the impact of historical ties expressed through a former colonial relationship on inward FDI from 
colonisers to their former colonies in Africa. The focus is on how institutions matter, and the extent 
to which they influence strategic choice (Peng, 2003) as regards FDI decisions. 
Tonoyan et al. (2010: 804) note that ‘Economic activities cannot be analysed without consideration 
of the formal and informal institutional context in which they occur.’ As Peng (2002) emphasises 
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‘Since no firm can be immune from institutional frameworks in which it is embedded, there is 
hardly any dispute that institutions matter.’ Institutions are ‘the rules of the game of a society’ 
(North 1995: 54) or, more formally, ‘the humanly devised constraints that structure political, 
economic and social interaction’ (1991: 97). Scott (1995:33) defines institutions as “cognitive, 
normative, and regulative structures and activities that provide stability and meaning to social 
behavior.” Peng et al. (2009) note that North's scheme of distinguishing between formal and 
informal institutions is complementary to Scott's concept of regulative, normative, and cognitive 
supportive pillars. 
Institutions are composed of formal rules, such as, statute law, informal constraints, for example, 
norms of behaviour, and the enforcement characteristics of both. Formal institutions embody 
structures of codified and explicit rules and regulations that shape interaction among members of 
a society, and which establish the economic and legal constraints of a country (North, 1990). 
Informal institutions include socially sanctioned norms of behavior and codes of conduct, which 
are embedded in culture and ideology (Scott, 1995; Salomon and Wu, 2012). North (1990) 
suggests that in situations where formal constraints fail, informal constraints will come into play 
to reduce uncertainty and provide constancy to organizations. 
The formal institutions particularly important to managers include regulatory, political, and 
economic institutions. These formal institutions represent an established order within which 
businesses operate (Holmes et al., 2013). Informal institutions or constraints are captured in 
routines, customs, traditions, and culture (North, 1992).  According to Holmes et al. (2013: 533) 
‘Understanding formal institutions, … requires understanding the logic and rationale underlying 
the solutions societal members develop, and this logic and rationale are embodied in the society’s 
informal institutions.’ 
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Institutions have an impact on the cognitive and ethical considerations that shape human judgment 
and behaviour (North, 1990; Scott, 1995). They affect organizational behaviour by constraining 
and determining which actions are acceptable and supportable within and between organisations 
(Tonoyan et al., 2010) and reduce uncertainty and transaction costs for economic transactions 
(Davis & North, 1971). Holmes et al. (2013) argue that the presence of legitimate and recognized 
institutions to oversee business behaviour is critical for long-term wealth creation and so 
institutions both impose constraints and provide opportunities. More explicitly, Peng (2002: 252) 
argues that ‘any strategic choice that firms make is inherently affected by the formal and informal 
constraints of a given institutional framework’. 
North (1991: 97) maintains that ‘institutions evolve incrementally, connecting the past with the 
present and the future; history in consequence is largely a story of institutional evolution in which 
the historical performance of economies can only be understood as a part of a sequential story.’ In 
this way, “[h]istory matters. It matters not just because we can learn from the past, but because the 
present and the future are connected to the past by the continuity of a society’s institutions” (North, 
1990: vii). Boettke et al. (2008: 332) propose that “institutional ‘stickiness’—the ability or inability 
of new institutional arrangements to take hold where they are transplanted—is central to 
understanding how history matters for institutions. 
Where MNE managers have discretion in allocating investment, FDI decisions reflect their 
evaluation of the potential available in a country conditioned by the assistance and constraints 
presented by the country’s institutional environment (Pajunen, 2008). More specifically, 
investment will be directed to those countries where the institutional environment facilitates MNEs 
in leveraging their firm-specific advantages and accessing local resources (Dunning, 1998). 
Consequently, institutions have an important influence on firms’ international strategies and 
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performance (Peng, Sun, Pinkham, & Chen, 2009; Peng, Wang, & Jiang, 2008; Holmes et al., 
2013).  
The liability of foreignness 
Institutional theory is traditionally concerned with how an organisation may establish legitimacy 
in the setting of a particular institutional environment. Hymer (1976) first posited that firms 
establishing operations abroad face certain unavoidable costs that firms operating in their own 
home environment do not. It is now generally accepted that MNEs face an initial disadvantage 
when operating in foreign countries compared to local firms (Mezias, 2002; Zaheer and 
Mosakowski, 1997; Salomon and Wu, 2012). This  ‘liability of foreignness’ stems from 
unfamiliarity of the environment, associated with cultural, political, and economic differences, and 
from the need for coordination across geographic distance, which is worsened by a lack of 
legitimacy in the host country (Zaheer, 1995). These disadvantages generate additional costs to 
foreign firms that a local firm would not incur, such as, coordination costs and transaction costs, 
the relative importance of which will vary by firm, industry, host and home country. In general, it 
would be expected that compared to local firms a foreign firm would be at a competitive 
disadvantage, which would adversely impact its financial performance and probability of survival 
(Zaheer and Mosakowski, 1997). 
Institutional distance refers to the extent of dissimilarity between host and home institutions 
(Kostova, 1996). Institutional distance hinders a foreign firm’s understanding of the host country 
market, for instance, reducing the ability to relate to customers and work with suppliers. Similarly, 
it is difficult for local organisations to comprehend foreign firms (Salomon and Wu, 2012). 
Consequently, the liability of foreignness increases as institutional distance increases and so 
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foreign firms from institutionally distant countries are perceived as less legitimate and the more 
difficult it is for them to establish legitimacy in the host country (Kostova and Zaheer, 1999). 
Kostova and Zaheer (1999: 68) point out that foreignness presents challenges to legitimacy 
because of the lack of information about the MNE on behalf of the host environment; the use of 
stereotypes and different standards in judging foreign firms; and the use of MNEs as targets for 
attacks by interest groups in the host country. This means that a critical issue faced by MNEs 
involves the establishment and maintenance of organizational legitimacy, i.e., the acceptance of 
the organization by its host environment, which is vital for survival and success. It will be easier 
for an MNE to understand and adjust to the legitimacy requirements of a country that is 
institutionally similar to its home country than of one that is institutionally distant (Kostova and 
Zaheer, 1999). Kostova and Zaheer (1999: 76) also note that ‘Historically shared perceptions about 
certain countries or regions in a particular host country can also influence the legitimacy of any 
firm from that country’. 
The essential argument is that organisations are governed by a series of values, which in turn 
become norms and potentially routines and which therefore govern behavior. The importance in 
this context is that, at the macro level, national institutions and legal structures have a history, as 
does language and culture. Colonization by European nations of Africa has greatly influenced 
institutional development in Africa, as well as the adoption of European languages. This has also 
influenced systems of corporate governance, as well as the role of government in business, and 
responses to corruption.  
Formal institutions foster certain expectations in terms of firm behaviour, with the greater the 
familiarity with this in a home country setting, the lower the liability of foreignness through a 
reduction in institutional distance. LOF signifies that foreign MNEs, compared to host country 
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domestic firms, are at a disadvantage because they are less familiar with local knowledge, laws, 
language, etc. However, historical ties between home and host countries can reduce the degree of 
LOF, offering investing MNEs from the former coloniser advantages not available to other foreign 
MNEs. For instance, Ellis et al. (2018) argue that Africa’s recent colonial history can create a sense 
of familiarity for some foreign investors, especially those headquartered in the UK and France. In 
the context of historical ties and FDI, historical ties reduce the uncertainty associated with 
economic exchanges between two countries and increase the trust between the parties involved. 
This helps investors obtain legitimacy in host countries. Further, historical ties may promote an 
enduring interaction which can help develop a strong social relationship between two countries 
(Chowdhury and Maung, 2018). 
In summary, when an MNE decides to make a foreign direct investment, it enters a new host 
country environment that presents unique challenges stemming from institutional differences 
between the MNE’s home country and the host country (Calhoun, 2002).  The MNE must adapt 
to the host country culture, learn new ways of conducting certain functions and also satisfy multiple 
legitimacy requirements and expectations (Zaheer, 1995). This creates tensions between the MNE 
and a particular host country and ultimately ‘institutional distance leads to higher costs and risks 
because of lack of understanding of the institutional order, inability to simultaneously adjust to 
institutional requirements in multiple countries, challenges in establishing external legitimacy, and 
increased internal and external complexity’ (Kostova et al., 2019, online). This is especially the 
case where MNEs move from a more institutionally developed home environment, where formal 
institutions can be relied on, to institutionally less developed host countries, which requires 
adopting new strategies. However, MNEs from a former coloniser country may be at an advantage 
in a former colony country where the institutional conditions are predicated on a colonial 
14 
relationship because this will create a greater understanding of the legitimate action the MNE may 
undertake and reduce the uncertainty and costs of coping with the host country institutions. On the 
other hand, MNEs from the former coloniser may be at a disadvantage given the negative 
associations of the period of colonisation. Consequently, LOF may vary both geographically and 
temporally. So, although institutional distance may matter, what is also important is developing a 
focus on the home and host country context (Harzing and Pudelko, 2016: 27) and in the specific 
historical context of this paper, the former colonial experience. We seek here to combine these 
perspectives, and to explore this within the setting of whether previous colonial ties influence FDI 
decisions. 
Hypothesis Development 
The implications of the colonial relationship for FDI 
Historical ties, as evinced by a prior colonial relationship, lead to the development of formal ties 
between countries. Here, we do not imply that two countries are affiliated through a formal 
relationship contract, such as a free trade agreement, rather the formal tie comes through similarity 
of formal institutional arrangements following the colonial experience (Makino and Tsang, 2011). 
Such formal ties can promote greater trust between nations (Rangan and Sengul, 2009) and greater 
trust is likely to make host nations more receptive to FDI from metropole nations (Guiso et al. 
2009). An important formal tie is the nature of legal arrangements between nations. La Porta et al. 
(1998: 1115) recognising that laws in different countries ‘are not written from scratch, but rather 
transplanted – voluntarily or otherwise –’ emphasize the importance of the identity of the coloniser 
and legal origin on current institutions. Klerman et al. (2011: 380) point out that the reason almost 
all legal systems of the world belong to either the common law or the civil law is that the European 
powers imposed their legal systems on their colonies. ‘Consequently, “legal origin” is almost 
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perfectly congruent with “colonial history” understood as the identity of the dominant colonizing 
power. This is echoed by Young (1994: 283) who emphasizes that institutions set up by the 
colonists persisted long after the colonial regime ended: ‘although we commonly described the 
independent polities as ‘new states’, in reality they were successors to the colonial regime, 
inheriting its structures, its quotidian routines and practices, and its more hidden normative theories 
of governance’. In this respect, ‘colonial institutions matter because they influenced the 
development of later institutions’ (Jones, 2013: 182). Further, as noted, North (1990) argued 
institutions matter because they define the rules of the game in a society and thus determine the 
payoffs associated with both productive and unproductive activities.  
As well as formal ties between nations, informal ties evolve as a result of, amongst other factors, 
colonisation (Makino and Tsang, 2011). These ties take the form of cultural, ethnic, and social 
relations, which shape shared values, norms, and cultural beliefs, and narrow the gap in 
expectations and understanding between countries. For instance, research shows that prior colony-
coloniser relations strengthen the social relations between countries and play a significant role in 
facilitating bilateral trade and investment (Ghemawat, 2001; Frankel and Rose, 2002). Thus, for a 
firm from an ex-coloniser to be successful in a former colony, it must steer through the potentially 
unstable formal institutional environment of the host market, and manage the informal institutions, 
for example, through interpersonal networks and cultural understanding (Hoskisson et al., 2000). 
If, as the prior literature discussed above suggests, a colonial relationship explains FDI decisions, 
then this will manifest itself in higher levels of FDI stocks of former colonisers, which are 
themselves a key driver of FDI inflows from colonisers. We argue that even allowing for this, the 
colonial relationship confers on the firm a country specific advantage (Rugman, 2010), through 
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familiarity of institutions and environment, in terms of leveraging its firm specific advantage into 
new markets. 
This discussion is reflected in the first hypothesis. 
 
H1: Colonial ties will be positively and significantly related to inward FDI, controlling for past 
FDI stock. 
 
The heterogeneous impact of colonisation 
The impact of colonization by different colonisers was not homogeneous, the failure to recognize 
this means that the estimation of “coloniser effects” in previous studies may be biased (Lee and 
Schultz, 2012). The colonial histories of African countries were diverse (Zoogah et al., 2015). The 
British, French, and Spanish had very different colonial philosophies, with the French and Spanish 
more centralized than the British who adopted a decentralized approach, (Grier, 1997). Collier 
(1982) summarizes the situation as follows, ‘The French introduced common legal, political and 
administrative institutions through French Africa, while the British were more institutionally 
flexible, seeking to preserve and accommodate diverse ethnic traditions, identities and institutions’ 
(Collier, 1982: 81; quoted in Brown 2000: 30). 
 Being a colony of the British, rather than another country, significantly affected legal institutions 
(the British imposed common-law systems, other European powers introduced (French) civil-law 
systems) later financial development, and economic performance (La Porta et al. 1998; 2008). For 
instance, La Porta et al. (1998) find that along a variety of dimensions, common-law countries 
provide the best legal protections to shareholders, in contrast French civil-law countries provide 
the worst legal protections to shareholders. Similarly, common-law countries give creditors strong 
legal protections against managers, while the civil-law countries give creditors the weakest 
protections. Also, protection of property rights is strong in common-law countries whereas it is the 
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weakest in the civil-law countries. Other studies have found that common-law is associated with 
lower formalism of judicial procedures (Djankov et al. 2003) and greater judicial independence 
(La Porta et al. 2004) than civil-law. La Porta et al. (2008) note that these indicators are associated 
with better contract enforcement and greater security of property rights. Former British colonies 
perform better on average than their French counterparts in terms of economic growth (Grier, 
1999; Bertocchi and Canova, 2002). Faster economic growth has also been shown to attract FDI 
inflows (e.g., Choi, 20004; Mohamed and Sidiropoulos, 2010; Kandil, 2011). 
In general, Britain engaged in institutional development, or the imposition of governance and 
institutions to a greater extent than the other imperial powers. Equally, the colonial language has 
survived in the indigenous population to a greater extent. A common language reduces transaction 
costs and facilitates business exchanges (Doh et al., 2009). The languages of the colonisers, the 
British in particular, were imposed as the most prestigious languages and came to dominate 
administrative and mercantile structures of each colony (Phillipson, 1992). In addition, Britain has 
in general retained strong links with its ex-colonies, through the Commonwealth i  and other 
diplomatic ties.  
Accordingly, we maintain that being from Britain confers a greater country level advantage to the 
firm than being from one of the other European colonial powers. Consequently, building on the 
first hypothesis, we again argue that prior colonial ties remain important even after controlling for 
past investments, and develop our second hypothesis: 
H2: Britain is more likely to exhibit the colonial relationship in explaining inward FDI to former 
colonies than the other European colonisers, controlling for past FDI stock. 
 
The duration of the colonial period 
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We explore the importance of the depth of the colonial relationship, by examining first the length 
of the colonial period and then the length of the period of independence. Our variable, The length 
of the colonial period, measures the length of the colonial period by subtracting the date of 
independence from the date of colonisation. However, a priori it is difficult to determine the 
expected sign of the coefficient. A longer period of colonization may be more favourable on 
average than a shorter one because it allows the coloniser to establish suitable institutions, such as 
educational facilities and infrastructure in the colony, that would be conducive to FDI post-
independence (Grier, 1999). As noted, several effects of prolonged colonial rule may be enduring, 
and may in time lead to the continuation of economic activity on a voluntary basis (Kleiman, 
1976). Grier (1999) reported that the length of colonization is positively and significantly 
correlated with economic growth over the 1961-1990 period, i.e., the longer the colony was held 
by the mother country, the better it did economically in the postcolonial era. The caveat is that the 
colonisers may have sought to retain the longest those colonies that performed the best 
economically (Grier, 1999).   
Conversely, the nature of the colonial experience may result in enmity towards the coloniser by 
the colonies, such that historical ties do not always produce economic relations that are positive 
(Makino and Tsang, 2011). The resulting problematic associations may produce significant social, 
and economic costs, that persist long after the conflict has been resolved (Alfaro et al., 2008) and 
which hinder economic relationships. For instance, there can be negative effects because of the 
colonial history associated with perceived status differences between representatives of firms from 
the former coloniser and host country stakeholders which may generate hostility (Liou and Rao-
Nicholson, 2017), there may also be animosity because of past labour exploitation and resource 
depletion (Jones, 2013; Nunn, 2007). As a result, the colonial history may exacerbate the negative 
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impacts of institutional distance and increase the LOF (Liou and Rao-Nicholson, 2017), including 
a negative effect on FDI flows.  
The LOF resulting from previous colonial relationships may becoming more important, with tacit 
sources of LOF resulting from previous colonial ties (Calhoun, 2002). Traditionally, FDI into 
developing countries has been efficiency seeking FDI or resource seeking FDI, however, this is 
changing to encompass greater levels of market seeking FDI. It is, therefore, necessary to 
reconsider the character of LOF in this setting. Host country consumers are likely to be more 
hostile to firms from the coloniser, associating colonisation with an unwanted period in the 
country’s history, such that the stronger the colonial relationship, the greater the LOF associated 
with market seeking FDI.  
When seeking to develop an understanding of the nature of the relationship between colonisation 
and subsequent resistance or hostility to the colonial power within the former colony, it is 
necessary to consider the different drivers of LOF in more detail. Slangen and Beugelsdijk (2010) 
and Luo and Mezias (2002) show that institutional hazards have greater impact on vertical (natural 
resource-seeking) FDI than on horizontal (market-seeking) FDI. With resource-seeking FDI, 
MNEs usually need to obtain approval from the host country government to acquire foreign natural 
resources. However, MNEs in natural resource industries frequently face difficulties in obtaining 
such approvals, for example, because the government may fear that national security would be 
threatened (Globerman and Shapiro, 2009; Henisz et al., 2014). Such discrimination costs may be 
particularly high when resource-seeking by foreign firms are considered unfavourably by local 
stakeholders. In the case of market-seeking FDI, where the goal is to sell products in the host 
country, differences in product demands between the home and host markets become the major 
concern of MNEs. Such differences mean that MNEs need to adjust their products to accommodate 
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the differences. Consequently, product adaptation costs are especially important in market-seeking 
FDI (Zhou and Guillen, 2016). Over time, with greater levels of market seeking FDI, product 
adaptation costs will become more prominent. These costs are likely to be exacerbated in countries 
where there are negative perceptions of products arising from FDI from former colonisers.  
The prior literature explores how firms may overcome the LOF (Zaheer, 1995; Zaheer and 
Mosakowski, 1997; Yildiz and Fey, 2012), focusing on organizational practices to overcome 
institutional distance. However, we argue that this may be particularly difficult for market seeking 
FDI, because the informal institutions engendering a LOF for firms from the former colony 
outweighs the benefits associated with reduced institutional distance. Further, we expect the LOF 
to increase with the extent of the colonial relationship. In this setting, therefore, there are 
competing forces in explaining FDI location decisions, that cannot be divorced from FDI motives.  
 
Although there is ambiguity associated with the expected sign of the coefficient, our theoretical 
position is informative. We have competing effects, based on the predictions from both 
internalisation theory and institutional theory. A standard transaction costs approach would predict 
a positive relationship, as the longer the colonial period the lower the institutional distance. 
However, the institutional theory approach suggests that norms, particularly hostility to the 
colonial power, will increase with the length of the colonial period. As we wish to test the effect 
of the length of the colonial period on FDI, for exploratory purposes we posit that the greater the 
length of the colonial period the less the extent to which firms from the European coloniser are 
welcome to engage in FDI by the former colonies. This is reflected in the following hypothesis.   
 
H3: There will be a negative relationship between the length of the time period the country was a 
colony and the extent of inward FDI flow from the former coloniser. 
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The time period since independence 
It might be presumed that the longer the period of time the former colony has been an independent 
country the weaker will be the influence of the colonial relationship and therefore the less the 
extent of FDI from the coloniser, i.e., the time period of independence will be negatively associated 
with FDI from the colonial power. However, it is necessary to develop a more nuanced view of 
the nature of the ongoing relationship, which is likely to produce both negative and positive effects 
on FDI from the coloniser, depending on the extent to which the colonial tie exhibits a history of 
antagonism or cooperation (Acemoglu et al., 2001). Consequently, as with the length of the 
colonial period, it is difficult to determine a priori the expected sign of the coefficient on the length 
of the period of independence. 
The character of the decolonisation process may have an enduring negative effect on FDI. In some 
countries decolonization was peaceful and orderly, in other cases independence was achieved only 
after a protracted struggle with decolonisation contested militarily. Where independence came 
after long periods of struggle, the relationship between the colonial power and the colony was 
problematic, which at least initially, would not be conducive to FDI. For instance, the violence 
sometimes associated with the independence process, through destroying part of the physical 
capital stock, is likely to have affected economic developments in the post-colonial era (Bertocchi 
and Canova, 2002). However, the negative effects of the military struggle for independence on 
FDI should not be overstated, as Kleiman (1976: 466) notes, most of the colonies attained their 
independence ‘on the whole through moral suasion rather than the use of force’. Nevertheless, 
other negative effects of colonization should not be ignored. Corruption, distorting government 
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policies, political instability and ethnic conflict, which affect the economic environment of many 
African countries, can also be seen as a legacy of the colonial era.  
Moss et al. (2004) note that although much of the ideological resistance to FDI by African 
countries has faded, in relative terms they still have not attracted much FDI. In part this is because 
of lingering skepticism toward foreign investment, which is entrenched in the history, ideology, 
and politics of the post-independence period. Independence occurred in many African countries in 
the late 1950s and 1960s, which means that some recent and ‘current leaders and employees in 
African firms were born during colonial rule or shortly after independence and, thus, have personal 
recollections of the experience’ (Ellis, 2018: 249) with the colonial past prompting negative 
perceptions. Such lingering effects of the colonial experience, for instance, foreign companies in 
Africa are often thought of as agents of imperialism and exploitation, and African governments 
may be worried about creeping neo-colonialism from the former coloniser, has produced a 
skepticism that has created a number of direct and indirect barriers to foreign investment that 
impede greater FDI inflows (Moss et al. (2004). The overall effect is that, despite the trend of 
investment liberalization throughout much of Africa, there are still substantial enduring biases 
against foreign investment in many countries. From their study of the acquisition of African firms 
by foreign firms, Ellis et al. (2018: 268) suggest that ‘colonial ties may hurt any business exchange 
in Africa where perceived quality, trust, and cooperation between firms (e.g., in alliances, supply 
chain transactions, entrepreneurial finance, etc.) are critical.’ 
These historical and political issues fueled the belief that African nations needed to take control of 
their economies after independence, a view that has had an enduring effect on FDI. Although 
explicit legal restrictions on foreigners have largely been eliminated, limitations still occur. For 
instance, Angola’s private investment law, passed in August 2015, discourages investors from 
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repatriating profits within the first several years of their investments by imposing higher taxes on 
dividends and profits. Investors face severe constraints in sending remittances abroad as profits 
and dividends repatriation are not prioritized for foreign exchange allocation in the restrictive 
Central Bank auction process (Export.gov 2017).     
In contrast to these negative forces on FDI from former colonisers, there may be an enduring effect 
of colonisation that sustains FDI from the former coloniser. As previously noted, in general, 
colonial influence persisted in its effect on institutions after political independence (Acemoglu et 
al., 2001; Bertocchi and Canova, 2002: 1864). Further, in many instances there have been strong 
ties between the former colonial powers and their ex-colonies (Brysk et al., 2002). Countries that 
were once integrated within the same colonial system often have institutional, linguistic and 
cultural similarities that facilitate the emergence of international institutions across them. For 
example, the Community of Portuguese Speaking Countries ( the Lusophone Commonwealth), is 
an intergovernmental organization mostly of former colonies of Portugal.  The prime objectives 
involve political and diplomatic cooperation between member states. Such strategic relations 
between nations can play an essential role in perceptions of investors that their investments will 
benefit from protection if challenges arise (Pal, 2017). Similarly, Lundan and Jones (2001: 103) 
identify a "Commonwealth effect" on the process of internationalization, whereby ‘the widespread 
use of the English language, coupled with similarity in institutional structures, legal systems, and 
business practices within the Commonwealth can lower the ‘costs of foreignness’, and 
consequently increase the possibilities for intra-Commonwealth trade and investment’. Further, 
colonial past and political alliances are major determinants of foreign aid (Alesina and Dollar, 
2000), with the percentages of national foreign aid programmes targeted to respective ex-colonies 
greatly exceeding the OECD average level of aid to these destinations (Brysk et al., (2002). Such 
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positive associations post-independence is likely to militate in favour of FDI by the former 
colonisers. 
The nature of the historical ties post-independence may, therefore, produce both negative effects 
and positive effects on FDI from colonisers to former colonies. This supports the contention of 
Zaheer (2002) that LOF is not immutable but that LOF is an inherently dynamic concept.  Zaheer 
(2002) emphasises that not all sources of LOF can be expected to continue unchanged indefinitely.  
LOF can increase, for example, a change in the host environment can lead to a fall in legitimacy 
of MNEs from particular home country, and decrease, for example, if the MNE increasingly aligns 
itself to the institutional conditions of the host country and becomes less of an outsider ( Zaheer, 
2002). 
We argue that the sum of the effects of the process of decolonization and the subsequent post-
colonial association is likely to produce a U-shaped relationship on FDI from the coloniser to the 
former colony: Following independence, when the deleterious effect of being a colony is a recent 
experience, there will be a negative effect on inward FDI from the former coloniser, which is likely 
to persist for some time. However, the perception of harmful consequences of colonization will 
tend to erode over time and continuing strong ties post-independence will eventually promote a 
positive effect on FDI from the former coloniser. This argument is reflected in the following 
hypothesis. 
 
H4: The time period of independence will be characterised initially by a negative effect on FDI 
from former colonisers, which will eventually be replaced by a positive effect on inward FDI from 
former colonisers. 
 
Models and Estimation 
25 
Our underlying model concerns the variations in inward FDI between countries, relating FDI to a 
series of time invariant effects, including natural resources, and relative country size. We include 
a measure of the bilateral stock of FDI in a given country, in order to distinguish between the 
extent to which past colonial links matter in explaining FDI stocks, compared with them explaining 
flows today. Any historical colonial links, that are no longer important in explaining inward FDI, 
may nevertheless explain variations in FDI stock. Developing this, we then seek to explain 
variations in inward FDI, given variations in FDI stock, by relating inward FDI to a series of 
economic variables, as follows: 
 
Inflow FDIit = α0+ α1 Instock FDIit-1 + α2 GDP Growthit-1 + α3 GCFit-1 + α4 GDPHOMEit-1 + α5 Xit-1 
+ μit (1) 
 
Inflow FDIit = β0+ β1 Instock FDIit-1 + β2 GDP Growth it-1 + β3 GCFit-1 + β4 GDPHOMEit-1 + β5 Xit-1 
+ β6 Colonial Relationi + μit (2) 
 
Inflow FDIit = θ0+ θ1 Instock FDIit-1 + θ2 GDP Growth it-1 + θ3 GCFit-1 + θ4 GDPHOMEit-1 + θ5 Xit-1 
+ θ6 COLONYi + μit (3) 
 
Inflow FDIit = λ0+ λ1 Instock FDIit-1 + λ2 GDP Growth it-1 + λ3 GCFit-1 + λ4 GDPHOMEit-1 + λ5 Xit-1 
+ λ6 COLONYi + λ7 RPit-1 + λ8 IPit-1 + λ9 IP
2
it-1 + μit (4) 
 
Where, Instock FDIit-1 measures the stock of FDI in the host country of investment pair i at time t-
1; GDP Growth it-1 measures the gross domestic product growth of African country in investment 
pair i at time t-1; GCFit-1 measures gross capital formation of African country in investment pair i 
at time t-1; GDPHOMEit-1 measures the GDP of the home country in investment pair i at time t-1. 
The control variables therefore include the standard vector of variables. The error term comprises 
μit = γi + t + it
ii. 
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It is important to note here that this specification is very restrictive in terms of testing our 
hypotheses. The importance of past investments in explaining current FDI will be captured by the 
stock variable. This is essentially a feature of history, and as such, the additional variables capture 
the additional propensity for a home-host link to foster FDI, given the level of FDI that has 
historically taken place. 
The vector Xit-1  contains a number of additional control variables which are specified as either 
host or home country: institutional quality measured by the length of time it is estimated to start a 
business in the country; other forms of investment, in this case the three international transfer 
variables, FDI as a percentage of GDP, ODA (official overseas aid) as a percentage of GDP and 
REM (Remittances) as a percentage of GDP; international trade as a percentage of GDP; per capita 
GDP growth; population growth; and natural resource as a percentage of GDP; and bilateral net 
aid flows. These variables are standard in models seeking to explain variation in inward investment 
penetration (Driffield and Munday, 2000) iii.  
The units of the variables in the raw data are measured as follows: inflow, instock, GCF, net aid 
flow and GDP are in millions of US dollars, time of business starting is in days. However, the units 
of the variables have been eliminated in our standardized analysis process. 
The Colony vector takes various forms in order to capture several aspects of the colonial 
relationship. Our second model therefore captures a former bilateral colonial relationship as a 
dummy variable, seeking to explore whether inward FDI is greater where there existed a former 
colonial tie. It is important to note here that by construction, these different models place different 
demands on the data, and by necessity involve different samples of the population of pairwise 
relationships. Models 1 and 2 are estimated on the full sample. In model 2, we use the ex-colonial 
relationship dummy, which indicates 1 if there was such a colonial relationship, 0 otherwise. Thus, 
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the sample is divided into FDI from the former colonisers to their respective former African 
colonies and that from other source counties to 49 African countries. The second subsample 
obviously includes those FDI links from the former colonisers to their non-ex-colonies. 
In model 3, we explore the colonial relationship in more detail by examining specific former 
colonisers. The COLONY vector is changed to dummies of UK, France, Italy, Belgium, and Iberia 
(due to the low number of colonies that Spain and Portugal had in Africa, this group is combined 
and labelled ‘Iberia’). As these variables are a simple decomposition of the colony variable 
discussed above, the data still incorporate the full sample of pairwise FDI flows. The country 
dummies are denoted as 1 if the former coloniser in the FDI link is Britain, France, etc. 
respectively, 0 otherwise. These dummies divide the sample into FDI from the specific former 
coloniser to its corresponding ex-colonies and that from other source counties to 49 African 
countries. Model 3 (and Model 4) also include a Bilateral Investment Treaty (BIT) dummy variable 
between the home and host countries. In the context of our study this is an important control 
variable. As the literature on BITs shows (Neumayer and Spess, 2005; Egger and Pfaffermayr, 
2004), the importance of BITs to the firm is the signal that both it has a degree of support from its 
home government in protecting its property rights, but also that it has recourse to arbitration at the 
investor-state dispute settlement (https://www.iisd.org/investment/dispute/). It may be argued that 
such assurances are more important where there is either a degree of enmity between the host and 
home country governments, or a degree of unfamiliarity. 
In Model 4, we seek to capture the importance of the length of time of colonial rule and the length 
of time since independence. RPit-1 is the period of colonial rule; IPit-1 is the period since 
independence; IP2it-1 is the period since independence squared. By definition this only applies to 
the country pairs where there was a colonial relationship. This is the only model therefore where 
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all of our country pairs in the sample are colonial-linked pairs. As a result, the sample drops 
dramatically as it is confined to a set of country pairs that include the former colonisers and their 
respective former African colonies. 
The operational definition of the variables is shown in Table 1.  
[Insert Table 1 Here] 
Data 
The core data used in this study are taken from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators 
(WDI). Our dependent variable is inward FDI to countries in Africa. The bilateral FDI statistics 
including inward FDI flow and inward FDI stock, and the net bilateral aid flows from the 
development assistance committee (DAC) donors are from UNCTAD. The data concerning the 
colonial relationship between the former colonial countries in Africa and the former colonial 
powers in Europe is collected from the ‘Index of Possessions and Colonies’ in World Statesman 
(www.worldstatesmen.org), which includes the period of colonial rule and the period since 
independence. 
We construct a balanced panel of annual observations from 2001 to 2012, which contains almost 
the entire sample of African countries from the WDI. We start with the full set of FDI source 
countries, but then subsequently explore the importance of the nature of the colonial relationship, 





Descriptive statistics are provided in Tables 2 and 3 along with correlation coefficients, which are 
not suggestive of a multicollinearity problem. All VIFs are well below the threshold considered to 
suggest bias in the estimators, as shown in Table 4. 
[Insert Table 2 here] 
[Insert Table 3 here] 
[Insert Table 4 here] 
 
There are a number of econometric considerations to be taken into account with this estimation. 
The first is potential endogeneity, which in turn informs the choice of estimator. The most likely 
candidates are that FDI influences growth, or gross capital formation, rather than the other way 
around. Standard endogeneity tests confirm that these variables can be treated as at least weakly 
exogenous. In addition, there is a related specification question. It is well understood within the 
applied FDI modelling literature that while FDI decisions are made with respect to forward looking 
expectations, they are also made with respect to information at the time. On the basis that there is 
then a lag between the decision and the investment, we tested various models using different lag 
length. Clearly, this does not impact on treatment of the colony variables as they are time invariant, 
but the control variables indicate that a lag of one year is appropriate. This also removes the 
prospect of endogeneity. In addition, we carried out the usual specification tests, for issues such 
as omitted variable bias, and included other controls in alternative specifications, such as labour 
costs, and other measures of human capital, which were insignificant and did not add to the 
explanatory power, or to any inferences regarding the variables of interest. In the analysis the data 




Table 5 illustrates the marked differences between FDI flows and stocks between country pairs 
with a colonial relationship, and those without a colonial relationship. It is notable that the colonial 
relationship appears important in explaining past FDI flows, however, we seek to move the debate 
on, and ask whether, controlling for this, such relationships still matter. 
[Insert Table 5 here] 
Table 6 reports the results for the various model specifications. In Model 1, Model 2 and Model 3, 
which are based on the same sample, the following control variables are significant with the 
expected signs: FDI inward stock, Gross Capital Formation, GDP per capita growth, FDI as a 
percentage of GDP, remittances as a percentage of GDP, Time of Business Starting, GDP of home 
country, ODA as a percentage of GDP, Population growth, and International trade as a percentage 
of GDP. Table 6 reports the standardised coefficients respectively for each model. 
 
[Insert Table 6 here] 
Model 1, the baseline model, is typical of FDI gravity models. This presents the results for all 
possible bilateral relationships in the data. Model 2 tests whether, controlling for all other factors, 
the colonial relationship is significant in explaining the variation in bilateral FDI flows. As 
indicated above, this is a very restrictive test, as we control not only for FDI into the country in 
general, but also the stock of FDI from a given source country, which is by some margin the most 
significant factor. Because the variables are standardised the reported estimates cannot be 
interpreted as elasticities. However, some interesting features stand out, for example, for every 
$1million of FDI stock a country has from a given source country, that would be expected to 
increase inflows of FDI by some $50,000. This illustrates the importance of history in our model, 
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which is an important feature of an appropriately specified gravity model and highlights the fact 
that we are explaining FDI flows after controlling for this. 
The coefficient on Ex-colonial Relationship is as expected positive and significant (p<0.10), 
consequently, we have support for H1 that colonial ties are positively and significantly related to 
inward FDI.  
Model 3, which replaces the colonial dummy with a series of country level colonial power 
dummies, shows that the variable for the UK is positive and significant (p<0.01). This finding 
supports H2, which argues that the UK is more likely to exhibit the colonial relationship in 
explaining FDI flows than the other colonisers. Using the marginal effects estimated at the mean, 
the results show that if the country was a former colony of Britain, then that is expected to increase 
FDI from Britain by some $570m per year, ceteris paribus. Although the coefficient for France is 
also positive and significant (p<0.01), it is noticeable that the coefficient for Britain is almost seven 
times larger than that for France, indicating the stronger relationship for the UK. It may also be 
noted that the coefficients for Italy, Belgium and Iberia are negative and significant (p<0.1 and 
<0.01 respectively). On average however, if a country had been colonised by another European 
country, that would now be expected to increase FDI from that country by just under $1m a year.  
These findings highlight the importance especially of the British and French colonial relationships 
in explaining inward FDI. When controlling for history (through the FDI Inward Stock variable), 
as well as for other relationships such as aid and remittances, both Britain and France are much 
more likely to invest in their former colonies than elsewhere in Africa. These relationships clearly 
bestow a degree of country level advantage on Britain and France when it comes to investing in 
their former colonies. Taken together, these results highlight some important findings in terms of 
the nature of the relationship between (developed) home countries, and (developing) host countries 
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in explaining FDI flows. Earlier literature has focused on a number of proxies for the strength or 
longevity between two countries, using measures such as remittances or aid flows. Our results 
nuance these relationships, examining the importance of colonial ties, as well as more modern 
institutional arrangements. For example, Model 3 also shows that along with colonial relationships, 
the coefficient of Bilateral Investment Treaty is positive and significant, while the coefficient of 
net aid flows is not significant. This suggests that institutional links between countries are more 
important in explaining FDI flows than relationships hitherto characterised by diaspora effects. 
Model 4 shows the effect on FDI flows of the time period of colonization and the period of time 
since independence, for only those countries who have had a coloniser. As noted, by definition 
this reduces the sample size considerably, and Models 1, 2 and 3 are not directly comparable with 
Model 4 due to the fact they are estimated on different samples. The coefficient on Period of 
Colonial Rule is negative and significant (p<0.01) providing support for H3, which posits that 
there will be a negative relationship between the length of time the country was a colony and the 
extent of inward FDI from the former coloniser. There is also support for H4, in that the coefficient 
on the variable Period Since Independence is negative and significant (p<0.01), whereas the 
coefficient on the Period Since Independence Squared is positive and significant (p<0.01). This 
indicates that although there was a negative impact on FDI inflow following independence, this 
negative effect declines and reverses over time. The significant coefficients on the time period 
since independence and the time period since independence squared implies that inward FDI to 
African ex-colonies from former colonisers initially decreases following independence, but then 
increases approximately 46 years after independence, as shown in Figure 1. 
[Insert Figure 1 Here] 
Robustness testing 
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A key contribution of this paper is to separate the importance of history from more obvious 
institutional or cultural ties. For this reason, we seek to control for the past stock of bilateral FDI, 
to allow for the fact that countries with higher stocks of inward investment may continue to attract 
such investment. The previous stock is one way of doing this, as by definition this captures all 
previous influences. However, an alternative is to seek to capture the FDI up to the end of 
colonisation and explain the importance of bilateral links since then. We therefore re-ran the 
model, replacing the lagged stock with value of FDI stock in 1980. The results are robust to this 
change in specification.  
Heterogeneity of data is a major issue in empirical work employing cross-sectional country 
analysis. Fixed effect panel data estimation allows for the influence of country specific 
characteristics. For three equations, the random-effects estimator rejects the restriction of fixed 
effects. However, the coefficients could be biased due to the presence of serial correlation in the 
panel data. The standard ‘clustering’ algorithm is used to allow for this, with the most common 
approach, clustering on country pairs being our preferred option, given that we are seeking to 
explore pairwise relationships - see, for example, Petersen (2008). We also clustered on host 
country, and also different regions of Africa. Our results are robust to these alternatives, and the 
difference between the clustered and non-clustered standard errors is small. As one would expect, 
results without clustering have slightly smaller standard errors, so we report the results with 
clustering.  
 
Discussion and Conclusion 
Based on the prior colony-coloniser relationship between African and European countries, we 
consider the effects of the historically determined relational factors on FDI inflows from colonisers 
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to their former colonies. Using the lens of institutional theory, we show how the institutional 
framework established through historical ties conditions the relationship between related 
countries.  Specifically, the historic colonial ties and resulting formal and informal institutional 
relationships by conditioning the liability of foreignness of the firms from coloniser countries in 
former colonies facilitates greater FDI flows from the coloniser. Essentially this comes about by 
mitigating the liability of foreignness experienced by the colonisers’ MNEs. We thus contribute to 
institutional theory in recognising the importance of institutions developed through historic ties in 
helping determine the strategic choice of MNEs.  
Current institutions having been shaped by colonial institutions underscores the endurance of 
historical ties and their effects on contemporary economic relationships. The positive prospects of 
FDI are a consequence of the reduced incidence of the costs of the liability of foreignness. In 
seeking to answer how colonial ties between European colonisers and their African colonies 
influence the flow of FDI between metropole and colony countries, we have reasoned that 
historical ties can reduce the degree of LOF, offering investing MNEs from the former coloniser 
advantages not available to other foreign MNEs. Relatively few prior studies have investigated 
whether the historic ties between two nations is important for FDI, and specifically in the context 
of African colonisation, consequently we make a new contribution to the literature, which is 
elaborated below. 
The goal of the study was to examine empirically how colonial ties influence inward FDI from 
European colonisers to their former colonies in Africa. In achieving this goal, we make several 
contributions to the literature. First, we confirm the basic argument of the paper that prior colonial 
relationships lead to greater inward FDI. As far as we are aware this is the first study that 
specifically examines inward FDI from the European colonisers to their former African colonies. 
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This study therefore adds to understanding of FDI in Africa, a continent that ‘has remained 
essentially off researchers’ radar screen’ (Zoogah et al., 2015: 7).  
Our evidence that the colonial legacy has an influence on FDI, suggests a path dependence effect 
of colonisation on FDI, and signifies that although institutions may be mutable  (North (1995: 56) 
notes that ‘the formal rules can be changed overnight, the informal norms change only gradually’), 
their effects may endure. Consequently, we further add to the literature on how institutions matter 
in the context of historical ties. However, this contribution on its own offers too simplistic a view. 
It is necessary to nuance this broad finding by unpacking the nature of the colonial relationship. 
Our findings are nuanced through recognising two aspects of the historical tie. These nuanced 
aspects provide new perspectives on historic ties, which have been under researched in the 
international business literature.  
First, the nature of the colonial experience dependent on the specific European coloniser. We 
acknowledge that the impact of colonisation on FDI by different colonisers was relatively 
heterogeneous, a feature which is not captured in studies which gauge the effect of colonisation by 
simply including a dummy variable for a prior colonial tie in empirical work.  We demonstrate 
that the colonial relationship with Britain, the country which engaged in institutional development 
to a greater extent than the other imperial powers, drives inward FDI to its former colonies more 
than the prior colonial ties of the other European colonisers. In doing so we show that coloniser 
effects are not homogeneous and that future empirical work considering such effects should avoid 
treating all coloniser-colony relationships as being the same.  
The second aspect of the colonial tie acknowledges the fact that a colonial relationship may be 
either beneficial or detrimental to the liability of foreignness of the colonisers’ MNEs, and indeed, 
over time both beneficial and detrimental characteristics may be experienced. The evolution of the 
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relationship thus conditions the extent to which the liability of foreignness is either elevated or 
alleviated by the historic tie. Consequently, we make a further contribution by unpacking the effect 
on FDI of both the length of the colonial period and the time period since independence. These 
aspects of the colonial relationship on inward FDI have not been examined in the prior literature. 
The effects of the length of the colonial period and the time period since independence on inward 
FDI to former colonies by the colonising countries is contentious, in the sense of acting both to 
encourage and to discourage FDI from the coloniser to the former colonies, resulting in uncertainty 
as to the expected sign on the respective coefficients. We find that the length of the colonial period 
has a negative effect on FDI flows from the coloniser, but that the period of independence has a 
U-shaped relationship, with the initial negative factors associated with the colonial history 
eventually being outweighed by the positive factors associated with the enduring relation between 
the respective countries. These are new contributions which add to our understanding of how 
historical ties effect FDI. 
The implications of the study for practice largely hinge on the realisation by managers of MNEs 
from coloniser countries that the colonial heritage may provide an advantage in terms of the 
compatibility of formal and informal institutions between colonist and coloniser nations. This 
advantage of the colonial relationship can mitigate the liability of foreignness, such that the MNE 
from a former coloniser may face fewer coordination, transaction and other costs associated with 
the liability of foreignness compared to non-colonist MNEs. Perceiving this cost advantage may 
induce MNE managers to initiate or further engage in FDI.  A caveat is necessary, however, 
because this positive view needs to be tempered by the actual experience of colonisation and the 
prevailing view of the colonial relationship by the colony country time at a particular point in time. 
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As previously noted, this may have been negative and therefore alienating for former colonist 
MNEs, although as again noted this effect tends to erode over time. 
It is widely recognised that FDI into Africa is at suboptimal levels, and well below the levels 
needed for the continent to achieve the millennium development goals. Much of the explanation 
of this situation is founded on institutional quality or institutional distance. The colonial 
relationship offers both a specific view of institutional distance and also a unique lens through 
which to view the theoretical construct of LOF. With regard to the question of FDI to Africa, is 
there a colonial legacy?  We show how colonial history illustrates both efficiency and legitimacy 
effects on FDI inflows. While colonial history established similar institutions, therefore enhancing 
efficiency in FDI, the length of colonial period and independence illustrates the legitimacy 
concerns against former colonisers. Our findings indicate that inward FDI to former colonies is 
positively associated with prior colonial ties, but the nature and influence of these historical ties 
surfaced in this study are more nuanced and complex than previously considered. 
 
Limitations and Suggestions for future research 
As with all studies, this paper has some limitations, which also provide opportunities for future 
research. While we have adopted institutional theory as the theoretical lens of the study, it would 
be useful for future research to consider other theoretical perspectives to better understand the 
effects of colonisation, including the length of the colonial period, and the time period since 
independence, as contingency factors on inward FDI. It may be necessary to draw on work in 
psychology, sociology, political science, or some other field, in order to achieve this. 
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It should be clear that this study has not developed a model that takes account of all influences 
determining FDI to countries in Africa. Rather it has focused on a coherent, yet limited, set of 
independent variables, because the main goal was to show the influence of prior colonial ties not 
to identify all possible predictors of FDI. Future studies could examine whether other variables are 
important in determining FDI to Africa in the context of former colonial ties besides the ones 
identified in this study. For instance, The British, French, and Spanish had very different colonial 
philosophies, with the British being more decentralised and flexible in their colonial approach, 
allowing colonies to adopt the institutions that best suited their situation, compared to the greater 
centralisation and bureaucratisation of the French and Spanish (Grier, 1999). The established 
governance framework is likely to be an important determinant of FDI especially for developing 
countries. Dysfunctional institutions and corruption by increasing the cost of doing business will 
diminish FDI activity, especially by Western MNEs (Desai et al., 2004); poor property rights 
protection increases the chance of expropriation of a firm’s assets making FDI less likely 
(Blonigen, 2005). The effect of the resulting differences in established colonial institutions and 
customs on FDI would therefore be worthy of investigation.  
The study does not take into account the uneven distribution of FDI inflow to Africa among the 
five sub-regions and countries of the continent. Unpacking the distribution of FDI inflows among 
the sub-regions and recipient countries by the former colonisers would provide a more nuanced 
understanding of the dynamics of FDI by the former colonisers. The study also does not take 
account of the different forms of FDI, which includes investment in cross-border mergers and 
acquisitions, reinvested earnings, greenfield investments and intracompany loans from parent 
firms. It would be fruitful to untangle the aggregate FDI figures in order to obtain a better 
perspective on the form of FDI arising from the former colonisers. This could be extended to 
39 
examine the extent to which the resource-seeking and market-seeking motives for FDI vary 
between former colonisers. It would be similarly useful to gain a better understanding of the 
sectoral distribution of the FDI, for instance, between the primary sector, manufacturing and 
services.  
This study did not examine in detail the nature of decolonisation. Although it has been recognised 
that where the nature of separation between the colony and the coloniser is problematic this may 
negatively affect FDI from the coloniser, this has not been examined in detail. Further, the ongoing 
relationship between the former colony and coloniser has been largely neglected. A good 
relationship is expected to favour FDI and vice versa. Studies that consider in depth the nature of 
the separation and the ongoing relationship between the prior colony and the coloniser as 
determinants of FDI would make a useful contribution to the understanding of the determinants of 
FDI. 
This study has considered the effect on FDI of colonial ties between European colonisers and 
countries in Africa. Our findings imply a complex relationship between former colonial ties and 
inward FDI from colonisers given that the experience of colonisation was heterogeneous and the 
effects of the length of the colonial period and the time period since independence on inward FDI 
to former colonies by the colonising countries is contentious. An obvious extension of this study 
is to consider these aspects of colonisation beyond the case of Africa. In particular, it would be 
useful to study the effect of the colonial relationship on FDI in the case of former colonies in Asia 
and the Americas.  
Recently, FDI from former colonies has been going to the former coloniser. For instance, the 
acquisitions of British firms by Indian multinationals, the investments in key sectors of Spain by 
multilatinas and the growing influence of Angolan investors over Portuguese companies (Pal, 
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2017). This aspect of the former colonial tie warrants greater investigation as a further 
development of the examination of the importance of historical ties. 
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Table 1  Operational Definition of Variables 
Variable Operational Definition 
FDI Inward Flow The inflow of FDI to countries in Africa 
FDI Inward Stock 
The bilateral FDI stock which captures the propensity of one country to 
invest in another in the past 
GCF The gross capital formation of African country 
GDP per capita Growth The gross domestic product per capita growth of African country 
FDI % GDP FDI as a percentage of GDP 
ODA % GDP ODA (official overseas aid) as a percentage of GDP 
REM % GDP REM (Remittances) as a percentage of GDP 
Population Growth Population growth 
Length of time needed to 
start a business The length of time it is estimated to start a business in the country 
International Trade % GDP The international trade as a percentage of GDP 
GDP of FDI Source Country The GDP of the home country 
Net Aid Flows The bilateral net aid flows 
Natural Resource % GDP The natural resource as a percentage of GDP 
Period of Colonial Rule The period of colonial rule 
Period since Independence The period since independence 
Period since Independence 
Squared The period since independence squared 
Bilateral Investment Treaty 
dummy 
The dummy Bilateral Investment Treaty (BIT) between the home and 
host countries 
Ex-colonial Relationship 
dummy The dummy of a former bilateral colonial relationship 
UK colonial dummy  The dummy that a former coloniser is the UK 
France colonial dummy The dummy that a former coloniser is France 
Belgium colonial dummy The dummy that a former coloniser is Belgium 
Italy colonial dummy The dummy that a former coloniser is Italy 




Table 2 Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
FDI Inward Flow 14,964 24.07674 284.718 -3156.36 16791.74 
FDI Inward Stock 14,964 213.6064 2070.401 -1527.28 80438.77 
GCF 14,068 1.17E+10 1.88E+10 1.61E+07 8.17E+10 
GDP per capita Growth 14,798 2.775668 6.404149 -62.21435 104.6576 
FDI % GDP 14,964 4.068277 5.597085 -5.496736 64.3841 
ODA % GDPiv 14,964 6.520849 7.35785 -0.251879 60.60922 
REM % GDPv 14,964 2.847461 5.168059 0 59.31327 
Population Growth 14,964 2.095381 0.952945 -2.628656 4.974578 
Length of time needed to start a 
business 11,419 37.35691 36.59003 5 260 
International Trade % GDP 14,849 78.38058 35.90643 20.96405 351.1057 
GDP of FDI Source Country 14,363 1.22E+12 2.70E+12 2.73E+08 1.62E+13 
Net Aid Flows 14,964 1.27E+07 6.95E+07 -9.82E+07 3.19E+09 
Natural Resource % GDP 14,750 13.57546 15.32233 0.0039506 85.32464 
Period of Colonial Rule 504 128.6429 118.4542 33 506 
Period since Independence 504 54.7619 8.853505 37 81 
Period since Independence Squared 504 3077.095 1016.633 1369 6561 
Bilateral Investment Treaty dummy 14,964 0.3841219 0.4864032 0 1 
Ex-colonial Relationship dummy 14,964 0.0336808 0.1804123 0 1 
UK colonial dummy  14,964 0.0112269 0.105364 0 1 
France colonial dummy 14,964 0.0152366 0.122497 0 1 
Belgium colonial dummy 14,964 0.0016038 0.040017 0 1 
Italy colonial dummy 14,964 0.0016038 0.040017 0 1 










Table 3 Correlation between variables 
  Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 
1 FDI Inward Flow 1 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
2 FDI Inward Stock 0.47  1 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
3 GCF 0.12  0.15  1 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
4 GDP per capita Growth -0.01  0.00  -0.03  1 - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
5 FDI % GDP 0.00  -0.02  -0.16  0.15  1 - - - - - - - - - - - - 
6 ODA % GDP -0.05  -0.07  -0.40  -0.02  0.08  1 - - - - - - - - - - - 
7 REM % GDP 0.01  -0.02  -0.06  -0.01  -0.05  -0.04  1 - - - - - - - - - - 
8 Population Growth -0.01  -0.05  -0.20  -0.02  0.10  0.54  -0.13  1 - - - - - - - - - 
9 Time of Business Starting -0.04  -0.03  -0.22  -0.03  0.02  0.20  0.04  0.20  1 - - - - - - - - 
10 International Trade % GDP -0.03  -0.01  -0.21  0.10  0.39  -0.26  0.18  -0.44  0.15  1 - - - - - - - 
11 GDP of FDI Source Country 0.08  0.10  -0.06  -0.01  0.05  0.07  0.01  0.08  0.05  0.03  1 - - - - - - 
12 Net Aid Flows 0.09  0.08  -0.01  0.00  0.00  0.10  0.01  0.09  0.04  -0.06  0.28  1 - - - - - 
13 Natural Resource % GDP 0.02  0.00  0.15  0.08  0.06  -0.11  -0.14  0.25  0.24  0.02  0.08  0.05  1 - - - - 
14 Period of Colonial Rule -0.01  0.01  0.00  0.06  0.23  0.31  0.09  -0.19  0.26  0.13  -0.55  -0.10  -0.21  1 - - - 
15 Period since Independence 0.23  0.03  0.17  0.01  -0.20  -0.20  -0.06  0.15  -0.29  -0.31  0.34  0.06  0.20  -0.46  1 - - 
16 Bilateral Investment Treaty Dummy 0.06  0.06  0.15  0.00  -0.05  -0.14  0.01  -0.13  -0.08  -0.06  0.01  0.07  0.05  0.30  -0.07  1 - 







Table 4   Collinearity Diagnostics 
Variable VIF SQRT VIF Tolerance R-squared 
FDI Inward Flow 2.52 1.59 0.3969 0.6031 
FDI Inward Stock 2.69 1.64 0.3711 0.6289 
GCF 3.14 1.77 0.319 0.681 
GDP per capita Growth 1.08 1.04 0.9255 0.0745 
FDI % GDP 1.51 1.23 0.6606 0.3394 
ODA % GDP 2.32 1.52 0.4312 0.5688 
REM % GDP 1.63 1.28 0.6125 0.3875 
Population Growth 2.41 1.55 0.4148 0.5852 
Time of Business Starting 1.36 1.17 0.7351 0.2649 
International Trade % GDP 3.05 1.75 0.3279 0.6721 
GDP of FDI Source Country 2.83 1.68 0.3533 0.6467 
Net Aid Flows 1.12 1.06 0.8943 0.1057 
Natural Resource % GDP 1.69 1.3 0.5903 0.4097 
Period of Colonial Rule 1.88 1.37 0.533 0.467 
Period since Independence 1.82 1.35 0.5498 0.4502 
Bilateral Investment Treaty Dummy 1.71 1.31 0.5847 0.4153 







Table 5 Comparison of FDI between Country Pairs with Colonial Ties and Country Pairs without Colonial Ties 





Flow 504 234.22 879.38 -1050.83 5.6 8035.74 
FDI Inward 





Flow 14460 16.75 235.36 -3156.36 0 16791.74 
FDI Inward 






Table 6 Regression Resultsvii 
Dependent Variable Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4  
FDI Inward Flow Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value 
FDI Inward Stock 0.153** 0.016 0.143** 0.011 0.135** 0.014 0.368*** 0.000 
(t-1) (0.0639)  (0.0560)  (0.0548)  (0.0914)  
         
GCF 0.0267* 0.055 0.0335* 0.055 0.0295* 0.069 0.850 0.400 
(t-1) (0.0139)  (0.0174)  (0.0162)  (1.010)  
         
GDP per capita Growth 0.0147** 0.046 0.0175** 0.019 0.0146** 0.045 -0.0668** 0.034 
(t-1) (0.00740)  (0.00742)  (0.00731)  (0.0315)  
         
FDI % GDP 0.0291** 0.021 0.0286** 0.023 0.0304** 0.014 0.0647 0.105 
(t-1) (0.0126)  (0.0126)  (0.0124)  (0.0399)  
         
ODA % GDP -0.0274** 0.039 -0.0257* 0.054 -0.0202* 0.081 -0.0849 0.388 
(t-1) (0.0133)  (0.0133)  (0.0116)  (0.0982)  
         
Remittance % GDP 0.0255*** 0.003 0.0227*** 0.003 0.0192*** 0.006 0.0688*** 0.001 
(t-1) (0.00848)  (0.00776)  (0.00695)  (0.0213)  
         
Population Growth -0.0242** 0.050 -0.0261* 0.059 -0.0222* 0.064 -0.0857** 0.047 




         
Time of Business Starting -0.0139*** 0.005 -0.0157*** 0.003 -0.0138*** 0.006 -0.0821 0.175 
(t-1) (0.00495)  (0.00520)  (0.00503)  (0.0606)  
         
International Trade % GDP -0.0475** 0.017 -0.0459** 0.029 -0.0485** 0.037 -0.0781*** 0.006 
(t-1) (0.0198)  (0.0210)  (0.0232)  (0.0286)  
         
GDP of Home Country 0.0417*** 0.008 0.0407*** 0.000 0.0372*** 0.000 -2.276* 0.067 
(t-1) (0.0157)  (0.00840)  (0.00686)  (1.241)  
         
Net Aid Flows 0.0637* 0.066 0.0459 0.218 0.0482 0.183 0.0187 0.493 
(t-1) (0.0346)  (0.0373)  (0.0363)  (0.0273)  
         
Natural Resource % GDP 0.0211* 0.083 0.0169 0.127 0.0211** 0.038 0.0182 0.918 
(t-1) (0.0122)  (0.0111)  (0.0102)  (0.175)  
         
Ex-colonial Relationship   0.132* 0.081     
   (0.0755)      
         
Bilateral Investment Treaty     0.0424*** 0.001 -0.149 0.480 
(t-1)     (0.0123)  (0.211)  
         




     (0.0130)  (0.0321)  
         
France     0.0287*** 0.000 0.124*** 0.000 
     (0.00685)  (0.0200)  
         
Iberia     -0.00405* 0.063 0.0924*** 0.000 
     (0.00218)  (0.00645)  
         
Italy     -0.00241*** 0.000 -0.196*** 0.000 
     (0.000489)  (0.0443)  
         
Belgium     -0.00557* 0.072 0  
     (0.00310)  (.)  
         
Period of Colonial Rule       -0.360*** 0.001 
       (0.113)  
         
Period since Independence       -6.494*** 0.000 
       (1.075)  
         
Period since Independence Squared       8.025*** 0.000 
       (1.201)  




Constant 0.00970 0.667 0.00874 0.602 0.00655 0.329 0.562 0.465 
 (0.0225)  (0.0168)  (0.00670)  (0.768)  
Mean of Dependent Variable 0.0132595  0.0132595  0.0132595  0.9621958  
SD of Dependent Variable 0.8890731  0.8890731  0.8890731  3.628362  
R-squared Within 0.0050  0.0052  0.0050  0.0184  
R-squared Between 0.5101  0.4157  0.4030  0.9775  
R-squared Overall 0.2635  0.2420  0.2528  0.6604  
Number of Observations 9076  9076  9076  315  
Number of Groups 1,117  1,117  1,117  38  
Clusters 132  132  132  5  
Standard errors in parentheses 






Appendix: Former European Colonisers and African Colonies included in the Analyses 
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Gabon   
(1839-1960) 
Sierra Leone  
(1787 -1961) 
    
Guinea  
(1849-1958) 
South Africa  
(1806-1931) 





    




    









    









    
Togo   
(1914-1960) 






     
Notes:  
First date is date of colonisation, second date is date independence. We adopt 1980 – the founding of Zimbabwe - as the time of independence of Zimbabwe 
(Rhodesia) rather than its earlier UDI. 
The study examines the former European colonies of Africa and so excludes Namibia (the former colony of South Africa) and also to avoid ambiguity excludes 
the joint British and Italian colony of Somalia. The countries of Ethiopia and Liberia did not experience European colonization and so are also excluded from the 
analysis. Data is not available for South Sudan. 
In legal terms the political status of Botswana, Egypt, Lesotho, Swaziland and Zimbabwe was that of a British dependency and in the case of South Africa a 







i Established in 1870, the Commonwealth is a voluntary association of 54 countries (formerly under British rule) including the UK. The Commonwealth aims to 
promote democracy, facilitate international negotiations between member countries and promote economic and social development 
(www.thecommonwealth.org). 
 
ii As such the μi term includes the standard individual level heterogeneity that is a common problem with gravity models and is addressed using the fixed effects 
estimation. This is in itself a restriction of the more general it term, and this restriction of fixed effects rather than random effects is tested using a Hausman test 
in the usual way.       
 
iii There are many variables that are added to the baseline gravity model in the literature, to test for example short run economic shocks, or the importance of 
infrastructure. We employed numerous other variables in our estimation, including inflation, differing measures of institutions, infrastructure, and exchange rates 
These neither improved the specification or changed qualitatively any of our results. Our emphasis was to generate a parsimonious gravity equation, building for 
example on Matyas (1998) Chaney or (2008), and then to augment with our colonial variables of interest. To validate this, we performed standard variable 
addition tests, and the hypothesis that these variables may be excluded is not rejected. 
 
iv Net bilateral aid flows from DAC donors are the net disbursements of official development assistance (ODA) or official aid from the members of the 
Development Assistance Committee (DAC). Net disbursements are gross disbursements of grants and loans minus repayments of principal on earlier loans. ODA 
consists of loans made on concessional terms and grants made to promote economic development and welfare in countries and territories in the DAC list of ODA 
recipients. 
 
v The data available in the WDI for the variable migrant remittances are entitled ‘workers’ remittances, compensation of employees and migrant transfers’. 
Giuliano and Ruiz-Arranz (2009) use this measure and find that for some countries the inclusion of ‘compensation of employees’ (which is often payments to 
embassy staff, or the like) can bias the remittance data. We do not make these adjustments as they do acknowledge that the correlation pre- and post- adjustment 
remains at 0.92. In addition, we acknowledge that remittances through informal channels may be substantial. 
 
vi Due to the low number of colonies that Spain and Portugal had in Africa, this group is combined. The results however are not sensitive to this. 
 
vii The results in Table 6 are based on regressions using standardized data. We used both the standardized and unstandardized data to explore the lag length, and 
to compare inferences regarding the nature of the relationship between the durations of colonization and post-colonization and FDI. The estimations are 
consistent on this point. Unstandardized results are available from the authors on request. 
                                                          
